


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
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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 25
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 1-4-87 REVIEWER: 

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DIA review(s)
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C O N T E N T S

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1. BOURGES-MAUNOURY'S FALL SHARPENS
ECONOMIC AND ALGERIAN ISSUES 
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3. FRICTION AMONG THAI ARMY COUP GROUP
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5. INDONESIA CHIEF OF STAFF MOVES TO
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1. BOURGES-MAUNOURY'S FALL SHARPENS
ECONOMIC AND ALGERIAN ISSUES

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The defeat of the Bourges-Maunoury government by a vote of 279 to 253 over the proposed basic statute for Algeria precipitates a political crisis in France at a time when the area of maneuverability for a prospective successor has been reduced to a minimum. The willingness of numerous conservative deputies to vote against the premier despite his plea for unity in the face of the pending UN discussion of Algeria emphasizes the weight of economic considerations in this vote.

Rightists' apprehensions that the government's proposal would lead to the secession of Algeria had intensified in the past week, despite the premier's efforts to meet objections. Pressure from the strong agricultural interests which are firmly opposed to Bourges-Maunoury's price controls swayed enough Independent and Peasant deputies who might otherwise have abstained.

By disavowing the Algerian policy strongly backed by the Socialists, the Independents and Peasants have widened the breach dividing the moderate forces in the Assembly. Without Communist support, no government is likely to be formed over the objections of the Independent and Peasant bloc, and President Coty's nomination of a candidate will be governed by this circumstance. Continuing pressure from labor and farmers for relief from Finance Minister Gaillard's anti-inflation drive may hasten a compromise, and a new government may be able to obtain support for the Algerian statute provided it eases unpopular anti-inflation measures.

President Coty has formally refused to accept Bourges-Maunoury's resignation and will probably

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wait until he can name a premier-designate. He had reportedly begun consultations on a possible new government before the Algerian debate but announcement of his decision will be delayed by the formalities incident to the opening of the new session of the Assembly on 1 October.

Ex-premier and Socialist leader Guy Mollet has been regarded as a possible replacement for Bourges-Maunoury since the time the latter took office less than four months ago. Another prospective candidate is ex-Gaullist and former governor of Algeria Jacques Soustelle who played a major role in rallying rightist opposition to the Algerian statute. Ex-premier René Pleven and Education Minister René Billeres, both representatives of center parties which might become the nucleus of a compromise coalition, have also been mentioned.

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3. FRICTION AMONG THAI ARMY COUP GROUP LEADERS SEEN

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The American attaché in Bangkok, in assessing the recent Thai army coup, foresees that friction may develop among the top levels of the new ruling clique.

He indicates that in any new struggle for power, General Prapat, Bangkok garrison commander and newly appointed minister of interior, is in a good position to emerge as a strong contender in his own right. The attaché notes that several of Prapat's friends and relatives also hold key posts.

Comment

Although Marshal Sarit is presently in firm control of the Thai government, stability in Thailand over the long run will probably depend on his ability to keep his ambitious subordinates in line.

Prapat, who has long been associated with Sarit, is considered one of the most able and ambitious officers in the Thai army. His rise, under Sarit's protection, has been rapid, and prior to the coup he was reputed to be the man who actually ran the army.

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5. **INDONESIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MOVES TO
PLACATE REGIONAL LEADERS**

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Two recent events suggest that Indonesian army chief Nasution may now be attempting to placate dissident provincial leaders in hope of modifying their demands that he resign. On 28 September, Lt. Col. Gintings, the pro-Djakarta commander in northern Sumatra, arrested Lt. Col. Macmour, a pro-Communist regimental commander,

and two subordinates for their activities against anti-Djakarta elements in the area. Macmour's supporters, both in his command and in the Communist-led civilian defense corps he has armed, have the capability of reacting forcefully. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On the same day, Nasution installed Maj. Somba, a close collaborator of Lt. Col. Sumual in East Indonesia, as commandant of a new military command there.

Nasution's actions would appear to be a blow to Sukarno. Until now, Nasution's behavior has been that of a loyal supporter of the President. [REDACTED]

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